1.
The
Election Commission of India is globally acknowledged as a ''Gold Standard'' in
conduct of free and fair elections with integrity in India. It has set
ever-higher standards of efficient, smooth and professional conduct of
Elections and has been at the forefront of embracing, adopting and implementing
the latest technological advancements in improving and fine-tuning the election
processes and systems.
2.
The
Commission has taken the pioneering initiative of introducing Electronic Voting
Machine (EVM) for recording, storing and counting of votes across the length
and breadth of this country in a transparent, credible and secure manner, duly
backed by appropriate legal support.
3. Over
the last twenty years, the Commission has successfully conducted 107 State Legislative
Assembly elections and 03 Lok Sabha elections using EVMs. Since September 2013,
Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) machines have also been used in
various State Assembly and Parliamentary constituencies for enhanced
transparency and credibility in the voting process.
4.
The
introduction of EVMs in 90’s was a positive
electoral reform by the Commission. Some doubts have been raised on the
functioning of the EVMs from time to time and from some quarters.
5.
After
the announcement of the results of the five State Assembly Elections (UP,
Uttarakhand, Punjab, Goa and Manipur), in March 2017, again certain doubts have
been raised on the functioning of EVMs. Some complaints and suggestions were
received by Commission after declaration of results of five State Assembly
elections. The Commission duly examined these complaints and asked for evidence
and credible material information supporting the claims, but so far no evidence
has been provided by complainants to ECI.
6.
A
group of thirteen political parties met the Commission on 10th April, 2017 and
expressed certain reservations about the use of EVMs. Some political parties
also raised queries about incidents relating to VVPATs used on 31/3/17 during
demonstration (NOT in actual poll) at Bhind (M.P) and Dholpur (Rajasthan)
Bye-elections held in the first week of April, 2017.
7.
To
understand the concerns of political parties, Commission convened an all-party
meeting on 12th May. A press statement was also issued by ECI the
same day to the following effects.
(i)
The
Commission stated before political parties that all future elections will be
mandatorily held with VVPATs. The Commission firmly believes that use of VVPAT
machines along with the EVMs in all polling stations, in all future elections,
will bring utmost transparency and credibility in the EVM-based voting system.
This will enable each voter to see for himself in VVPAT whether his or her vote
has gone to the right candidate. After press of button on BU, name and symbol
the concerned candidate will appear on the screen of VVPAT machine and paper
slip bearing name and symbol will be dropped in a sealed box connected with
VVPAT. These slips will serve as audit trial of the vote cast by voter on EVM.
Audit trail will enhance confidence and trust of voters. Use of VVPATs with
EVMs must conclusively put to rest all misinformed doubts and misgivings
regarding EVMs. It will also be a matter of pride that India will become the
first country to deploy 100% VVPATs or paper trail in the world, an element
that was missing in many countries including Netherland, Germany and Ireland.
Funds
for procuring the required VVPATs for 100% deployment have already been
sanctioned and production is to begin in August, 2017 and will be completed by
September, 2018.
(ii)
It
was also stated that the Commission has also taken into account suggestions
made by various political parties regarding counting of VVPAT slips. The
Commission will count VVPAT slips up to a definite percentage, which will be
determined by the Commission. The ECI will shortly evolve an appropriate
framework in this regard.
(iii)
The
Commission will hold a challenge and offer opportunity to political parties to
demonstrate that EVMs used in the recently concluded Assembly elections were
tampered or that EVMs can be tampered even under the laid down technical and
administrative safeguards of ECI.
(iv)
Commission
also urged all parties to ensure their continuous and qualitative participation
in all crucial steps during elections such as First Level Checking (FLC),
randomisation of EVMs/VVPATs/polling personnel, EVM preparation and candidate
setting, mock poll, EVM sealing and storage. The Commission also invited more
suggestions from political parties on how to further increase their
participation, so that absolute transparency is maintained at all times.
(v)
Commission,
further, urged political parties that improving integrity of election process
is a shared responsibility of all the stake holders. We solicited their
suggestions to fill up gaps, if any, during election and non election period.
The Commission made it clear that ECI want total transparency and have nothing
to hide from people and other stakeholders. Commission will always receive
suggestions from its stakeholders for improvement of its processes.
(vi)
The
Commission also emphasised that Commission is committed and it maintains
equidistance from all parties and groups. The Commission further emphasised
that ECI has no favourites. Further, this equidistance by ECI has enhanced
India’s
reputation in the eyes of the global community.
8.
The
Commission has already issued detailed Press releases on Credibility of
Electronic Voting Machines on 16th March, 2017, on alleged VVPAT
incident during mock EVM demonstration on 31st March 2017 (and not
in actual poll as alleged) at Bhind (Madhya Pradesh) on 07th April,
2017 and also regarding EVMs in Dholpur (Rajasthan) on 11th April,
2017. In Bhind, a wrong notion was created that for any key pressed on the
Ballot Unit, only one symbol was printed by VVPAT. Commission’s
thorough enquiry clearly established that during the EVM demo held on
31.03.2017 in DEOs office the 4 buttons were pressed during the demo and not
the actual poll and every time the correct corresponding symbol was printed. A
Status Paper on EVMs has also been circulated to all stakeholders on 12th
May, 2017elaborating various aspects about EVMs and VVPATs for information and
awareness. (All these documents are available on ECI website).
9.
Certain
complaints of alleged tampering of EVMs during the recently held Municipal
elections in Maharashtra and elsewhere also generated wrong perception about
EVMs of ECI. It was noted that confusion exists in the minds of many about the
jurisdiction of ECI. We would like to clarify once again on this occasion that
ECI is not responsible for the conduct of local body elections by the State
Govts in the country and consequently about various protocols and procedures
adopted by the concerned State Election Commissions. Election to local bodies,
both urban and rural, are conducted by separate constitutional authorities
State Election Commissions constituted by the State Govts. under Article 243 of
the Constitution. Moreover, a particular complaint of some candidate receiving
zero vote in Mumbai Municipal elections has been found to be totally false by SEC
Maharashtra.
10.
The
Commission is confident and has firm conviction about the integrity,
non-tamperability and credibility of the EVMs. The basis of confidence of the
Commission flows from a wide range of technical and administrative protocols
and procedural safeguards that protects our EVMs and VVPATs against any sort of
tampering during manufacture, transportation, storage, polling and counting
process. Still, the Commission is open to receiving from all stakeholders’ suggestions on how to
further improve the integrity and credibility of our EVMs and VVPATs. The
Commission will not allow even a shade of doubt about EVM operations.
11.
The
Commission would like to address some of the important issues that have been
raised from time to time in past two months:
A.ECI- EVMs are
not hackable as these, are stand alone machines and not connected to the
internet and /or any other network at any point of time
during polling. Hence, there is no chance of hacking.
The ECI-EVMs do not have any frequency
receiver or data decoder for wireless and hence cannot receive any coded signal
by wireless. Hence, no tampering can be carried out through external hardware Wireless,
Wi-Fi or Bluetooth device. Moreover, machines are always in the custody of
ECI and its election authorities.
B.
Manipulation at manufacturing stage is ruled out as
there is very stringent security protocol regarding the
security of software. Further, the Machines have been manufactured in different
years starting from 1989. After manufacturing, EVMs are sent by ECI to State
and district within a State. The manufacturers are in no position to know
several years ahead which candidate will be contesting from a particular
constituency and what will be the sequence of the candidates on the BU and,
therefore, cannot manipulate EVMs in a predetermined manner at manufacturing
stage.
C.Results cannot
be altered by activating a Trojan Horse through a sequence of key presses
because
1.
Trojan
Horse cannot be inserted into the software code of ECI EVM burnt into the
Microcontroller Chip since the chip is one time Programmable only.
2.
The
stringent security measures by ECI make it impossible to access the EVMs which
is an essential prerequisite for attempting to change the Micro-controller for
inserting a Trojan Horse.
3.
Control
Unit activates Ballot Unit for only one key press at a time. Any additional key
pressed on the Ballot Unit is not sensed by the Control Unit making it
impossible to send signals by pressing a sequence of keys or secret codes.
Once
a ballot key is pressed in CU, the CU enables BU for registering the vote and
waits for the key pressing in the BU. During this period, all keys in the CU
become inactive till the entire sequence of casting of that vote is complete.
Once any of the keys (candidates vote button) is pressed by a voter in BU, the
BU transmits the key information to CU in dynamically encrypted form. The CU
gets the data and acknowledges it by glowing the corresponding red LED lamps in
BU. After the enabling of ballot in CU, only the ‘first
key press’ is
sensed and accepted by CU. After this, even if a voter keeps on pressing the
other buttons, that is of no use as there will not be any communication between
CU and BU of those subsequent key presses, nor will BU register any key press.
To put it in other words, there can be only one valid key press (the first key
press) for every ballot enabled using CU. Once a valid key press (voting
process) is complete, until another ballot enabling key press is made there
will not be any activity between the CU and the BU. Hence, sending of any
malicious signal, by way of so called ‘sequenced
key presses’, is impossible in the Electronic
Voting Machines being used in the country.
D.ECI-EVMs cannot
be Physically Tampered with nor their components be changed without anyone
noticing. It is clarified that replacement of micro
controller/chip and the motherboard in earlier generations of machines like M1
and M2 is ruled out due to robust administrative and technical
safeguards. Further, the new M3 EVM produced after 2013 have additional
features like Tamper Detection and Self Diagnostics. The tamper
detection feature makes an EVM inoperative the moment anyone tries to open the
machine. The Self diagnostic feature checks the EVM fully every time it is
switched on. Any change in its hardware or software will be detected. Rs. 1900
Crore have already been sanctioned to the manufacturers for production of 13.95
Lakh BU and 9.30 Lakh CU of M3 generation. Also, 16.15 Lakh VVPATs are also
under production and Rs. 3173 Crore have been sanctioned for the same.
E.
The latest technological features make ECI-EVMs
tamper proof. The ECI-EVMs use some of the most sophisticated technological
features like one time programmable (OTP) microcontrollers, dynamic coding of
key codes, date and time stamping of each and every key press, advanced
encryption technology and EVM-tracking software to handle EVM logistics, among
others to make the machine 100% tamper proof. In addition to
these, new model M3 EVMs also have tamper detection and self-diagnostics as
added features.OTP software implies that the programme in the EVM cannot be
altered, re-written or re-read by anyone under safe custody of ECI. This makes
EVM tamper proof. If anyone makes an unauthorized attempt, the machine will
become in-operative.
F.
Contrary to misinformation spread and alleged by
some, ECI does not use any EVMs produced abroad. EVMs are produced
indigenously by two PSU manufacturers viz. Bharat Electronics Ltd., Bengaluru
and Electronics Corporation of India Ltd., Hyderabad. The Software Program Code
is written in-house by these two companies and not outsourced and approved by
TEC of ECI and subjected to strict security procedures at factory level to
maintain the highest levels of integrity.
The
software programme is converted into machine codeby
manufacturers and only then given to the chip manufacturer
abroad. (We don’t have the adequate
capability of producing semi-conductor microchips within the country). Every
microchip has an identification number embedded into memory and the producers
have their digital signatures on them. So, the question of their replacement
does not arise at all because microchips brought back to manufacturers are
subjected to functional tests with regard to the software. Any attempt to
replace microchip is detectable and can make EVM in-operative. Thus, both
changing existing program and introducing new one are detectable making EVM
in-operative because EVMs are tamper detect. Also the technological advancement
now permits fusing of the software on the chip at BEL and ECIL itself and
hence, in M3 the software is fused on the chip inside BEL and ECIL.
G.
There are no possibilities of manipulation in EVM
during transportation or at the place of storage.At
the district headquarters, EVMs are kept in a double-lock system under
appropriate security. Their safety is periodically checked. The
election authorities do not open the strong room, and they only regularly check
whether it’s fully protected and whether the
lock is in proper condition or not. No Unauthorized person can get access to
the EVMs at any point of time. During the non-election period, annual
physical verification of all EVMs is done by DEOs and report sent to ECI.
Further, strong rooms are always opened in the presence of representative of
political parties.
H.
There are different levels of checks and balances
ensuring tamper proofing of ECI-EVMs which are as follows:
• First
Level Checking: Authorized BEL/ECIL engineers certify originality of components
after technical and physical examination of each EVM,
which is undertaken in the presence of representatives of political parties.
Defective EVMs are sent back to the factory. The FLC Hall is sanitized, entry
is restricted and no camera, mobile phone or spy pen is allowed inside. The
Mock Poll is conducted on EACH EVM by election officials in the presence of
representatives of political parties.The Mock poll of at least 1000 votes is
conducted on 5% EVMs selected randomly by representatives of political parties
and the result shown to them. The entire process is video graphed.
• Candidate
Setting: Yet another significant safeguard is the process of
candidate setting, which is done after the finalization of contesting
candidates. A ballot paper is inserted in the Ballot Unit, which is then sealed
with Pink Paper Seal. BU is sealed at this stage. Where VVPATs are used,
candidates’ symbols are loaded in each VVPAT
at this stage. Once again, every EVM is subjected to mock poll and 5% EVMs are
randomly picked up for 1000 mock poll.
• Randomization:
EVMs are randomized twice while being allocated to an Assembly and then to a
polling booth ruling out any fixed allocation. As you can appreciate, till
first randomization no-one knows the sequence of names on the ballot paper till
the finalization of list of contesting candidates, the names of contesting
candidates are placed alphabetically on the ballot paper first for National and
State Parties, followed by other Registered Parties, followed by independents
and NOTA. Thus the Serial no. of any political party, candidate on the BU would
be variable from constituency to constituency. It is therefore clear that
serial no. of any political party candidate is not fixed or pre-determined in
all the constituencies of the state. Hence, till candidate setting, none, not
even RO or DEO or CEO or the Commission could know which button on which BU
will be assigned to which candidate.
• Mock
Poll of at least 50 votes at the polling station is also conducted in front of
polling agents of candidates on the poll day, before poll begins.
• After
Poll, EVMs are sealed and polling agents put their signature on the seal.
Polling agents can travel up to strong room during transportation of polled
EVMs from the polling station to the EVM Strong room.
• Strong
Rooms: Candidates or their representatives can put their
own seals on the strong rooms, where polled EVMs are stored after the poll and
also camp in front of the strong room. These strong rooms are guarded 24x7 in
multilayers, with CCTV facilities.
• Counting
Centres: The polled EVMs are brought to the Counting Centres
under security and in presence of candidates and Unique IDs of the seals,
signature of polling agents on CU are shown to representatives of candidates
before the start of counting.
12.Looking
at the above series of fool-proof checks and balances that are undertaken by
the ECI to make EVMs tamper proof, it is evident that neitherthe machines can
be tampered-withnor they can leave the ECI-EVM system. Further, neither
defective machines nor Non-ECI-EVM can get re-inducted/inducted into the
polling process at any point of time. Non ECI-EVMs will get detected by the
above process due to mismatch of BU & CU.
13. Some people
argue that why have Developed Nations like the US and the European
Union not adopted EVMs and some have even discontinued?
ECI
EVMs are far superior to any EVMs worldwide. EVM, used in the Netherlands,
Ireland and Germany were privately manufactured and had no independent
certification system unlike a very robust verification and certification system
through independent TEC or an ECI approved third party in case of ECI EVMs.
Also, voting data in these NEDAP EVMs in the Netherlands was transferred using
CDs, unlike our EVMs where it is stored internally and never transferred. Also
these countries lacked full end to end administrative and security safeguards
as well as legal framework. Finally their EVMs also lacked auditability.
A
point is raised from time to time that several foreign countries have
discontinued the use of voting machines and why India is using EVMs.
With
the rapid advances in technology over the years, Election Management Bodies,
professionals, experts, and activists (particularly Green Activists) have
mooted the idea of using paperless electronic voting methods in different parts
of the world in order to overcome the disadvantages of manual marking of paper
ballots. The marriage between technology and election management goes back to
at least 1892, when the first ‘lever voting
machine’ was used in New York,
after using the paper ballot for a long time. In the 1960s, punch-card machines
were introduced in the USA, and the first EVM was introduced there in 1975.
Electronic Voting has moved quite ahead since then.
Types
of Electronic Voting:
The
process of electronic voting can be of three types:
(i) Direct
Recording Machines placed at designated polling station,
(ii) Internet
Voting
• Remote
Online Voting
• At
Designated Polling Stations
(iii) Optical
Scanners
• Stand-alone
• Networked
for centralized counting of results
EVMs
used in India fall under the first type of stand-alone direct recording
machines with no possibility of any kind of network connectivity where voters
cast their votes at an assigned polling station on the day of election under
strict administrative security ensured by the ECI.
Even
though ECI EVMs are also direct recording machines ECI EVMs are completely
different from any of the EVMs used internationally either for direct recording
or for internet voting or for optical scanning. This is clearly highlighted in
the comparative analysis of ECI EVMs with the DRMs used in countries like
Germany, Netherland, Ireland, and USA as follows:
The
Netherlands
Electronic
Voting was used in The Netherlands in between 1990-2007. The voting machines
were manufactured by a private Dutch-company called NEDAP (Nederlandse
Apparaten Fabriek NV). In 2006, the government ordered an independent testing
of the voting machines. Two independent commissions, The Voting Machines
Decision-making Commission and the Election Process Advisory Commission (EPAC)
were also established on December 19, 2006 and January 18, 2007, respectively,
to review the security and reliability features of NEDAP machines.
Following
the observations of the two Commissions, the use of NEDAP machines and
electronic voting was discontinued in 2007 on the following grounds:
• The
Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relations (MOIKR) of The Netherlands lacked
adequate technical knowledge vis-à-vis
the NEDAP machines, leading officials to depend on external actors for the conduct
of elections.
• Technology
vendors became part of the decision making process and the ministry was not in
a position to exercise effective oversight.
• The
Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific Research (Toegepast
Natuurwetenschappelijk Onderzoek, TNO) certified and tested these machines
following “outdated standards” which were not immune
to modern IT and security threats.
• Moreover,
the certification and testing reports were not made public depriving
independent experts to verify the analysis.
• The
legal framework, particularly the necessary security requirements,
wasinadequate to deal with the specificities of the electronic voting process.
(For a comprehensive report on electronic voting in The Netherlands, see link:
https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/5_Netherlands.pdf)
Germany:
In
Germany, the e-voting machines manufactured by NEDAP were used in between 2005 – 2009 before it came
under criticism and finally discontinued. The Bundesverfassungsgericht (the
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) ordered the discontinuation of the use
of NEDAP machines in 2009 because of the below-mentioned reasons:
• The
use of Nedap electronic voting machines violated the principle of the public
nature of elections (Article 38 in conjunction with Article 20.1 and 20.2 of
the Basic Law) that requires that all essential steps in the elections are
subject to public examinability unless other constitutional interests justify
an exception.
• It
also observed that “it must be possible for
the citizen to check the essential steps in the election act and in the
ascertainment of the results reliably and without special expert knowledge”.
(See the judgment in the following link:
http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2009/
03/cs20090303_2bvc000307en.html;jsessionid=FEA71E86E2CEE030FF7AAAC905
72279C.2_cid383)
Ireland:
NEDAP
machines were used in Ireland in between 2002 – 2004. The use of these
machines was questioned following which two independent commissions were set
up. The two Commissions on the Secrecy, Accuracy and Testing of the Chosen
Electronic Voting System, concluded the NEDAP machines could not be used in
elections in Ireland on the following grounds:
• Inadequate
technological safeguards
• Insecure
transfer of data by the use of CDs
• Absence
of a comprehensive independent end-to-end testing, verification and
certification by a single accredited body
• Inconsistencies
in physical security of machines across constituencies
• Absence
of a clear policy guideline via-a-vis storage, transport, set-up, use and
disposal of voting equipment; and
• Absence
of comprehensive electronic register to record the identity, location and
movement of the electronic voting devices.
(See
links: http://www.umic.pt/images/stories/publicacoes1/00Index.pdf;
http://www.umic.pt/images/stories/publicacoes1/Part%200%20Index.pdf)
United
States of America:
In
2000, after the dispute on the voting method in the USA presidential elections,
the voting method was reviewed (Esteve, Goldsmith, & Turner, 2012: 185).
Accordingly, Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Systems (like the widely used
AccuVote TS developed by Premier Election Solutions, commonly called Diebold)
were introduced. DRE Systems uses “one
of three basic interfaces (pushbutton, touchscreen or dial)” through which “voters
record their votes directly into computer memory. The voter’s
choices are stored in DREs via a memory cartridge, diskette or smart card…Some
DREs can be equipped with Voter Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) printers...” Currently, in the USA,
the Direct Recording Machines are used in 27 states, among which paper audit
trails are used in 15 states. The other voting methods include: Optical Scan
Paper Ballot Systems, Ballot Marking Devices, and the Punch Card Ballot.
(See
link: https://www.verifiedvoting.org/resources/voting-equipment/)
Other
countries:
In
Brazil, the machines used in elections are called ‘electronic
ballot boxes’ which
are stand-alone direct electronic recording systems. In Venezuela, SATIS
(Smartmatic Auditable Election Systems) voting machines are used which were
fully implemented across the nation in 2004. (Esteve, Goldsmith, & Turner,
2012: 185)
India:
Indian
EVMs are truly unique compared to the e-voting machines used in other parts of
the world for the following reasons:
• ECI-EVMs
are stand-alone non-networked machines
• The
ECI-EVMs are manufactured in two PSUs namely ECIL and BEL, unlike machines used
in other countries, which were manufactured entirely by private entities. Hence
there is no chance of involvement of vested interest of private players or
technology vendors in decision making or production of the ECI-EVMs.
• ECI-EVMs
have been time and again successfully verified and certified by an independent
Technical Experts Committee after an end-to-end testing process. STQC under
Ministry of Information and Technology, an accredited third party entity,
conducts standardization and certification of ECI EVMs produced by
manufacturers, unlike the machines used in Netherlands,
• In
ECI EVMs data is stored internally and not transferrable by any device, unlike
other countries where voting data recorded in the DRM is transferred by means
of CD, etc.
• Commission
has evolved full end to end security protocol and administrative safeguards for
the use, storage, transportation and tracking of ECI EVMs, unlike in other
countries where NEDAP machines were used.
• Unlike
MOIKR of Netherlands, the Commission is fully backed by a Technical Expert
Committee comprising of eminent professors.
• Every
EVM has a unique number attached to it, which is recorded in the Election
Commission’s database through EVM Tracking
Software. This number of the EVM can always be cross-checked against the
database.
• The
software used in these EVMs is One Time Programmable (OTP), which can’t
be re-written after manufacture.
• The
ECI-EVMs are always under strict, uniform, high profile administrative and
physical security as per legal framework across the country.
• Section
61 A of the Representation of the Peoples Act 1951 allows the use of EVMs by
ECI. The different High Courts across the country have also upheld the use of
EVMs time and again in various judgments and the Karnataka High Court in 2004
declared ECI-EVMs as “national pride” because of its
transparency and robustness.
• Following
the direction of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the
ECI has introduced the technology of VVPAT in order to ensure public
verifiability. The Commission is committed to implement VVPATs nation-wide by
2019. Thus there will be 100% voter verifiability and auditability of every
vote cast as opposed to lack of such facility in the NEDAP machines, which was
struck down by the German Supreme Court as un-Constitutional, whereas Indian
Supreme Court has upheld the validity of use of EVM for conducting elections in
the country.
• Thus
any comparison of ECI-EVMs with machines used elsewhere is misplaced.
The Commission has always worked in an open and
transparent manner and always welcome questions, doubts and constructive and
decent criticism of our processes so that we can further strengthen electoral
processes.
During political party meeting on 12 May 2017,
Commission had promised to organise an open challenge to give an opportunity to
political parties to demonstrate that EVMs used in five States were tampered or
EVMs even under technical and administrative safeguards can be tampered.
Accordingly, ECI now proposed to open a challenge on 3rd June 2017
onwards to all political parties.
Frame-work of the
challenge:
Election
Commission of India invites the nominees of National and State Recognized
political parties who contested and claimed that the EVM machines held under
the ownership of Election Commission of India and used in the recently held
General Assembly Elections of five states namely Punjab, Goa, Manipur,
Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh in Feb-Mar 2017 were tampered or that these could
be tampered even under technical and administrative safeguards of ECI, to
demonstrate their claims at the ECI Headquarters within the framework of the
extant administrative and security protocols prescribed by the Commission.
Salient features of the EVM
Challenge of the Commission are as follows:
Challenge Statement I:
That
the EVMs used in the General Elections to five States-2017 were tampered to
favour a particular candidate/political party by altering the results stored in
the EVMs after the polls. The claimants will hence have to alter the
results in the Control Units used during these polls in exactly the same
scenario as the EVMs remain within the technical and administrative safeguards
of ECI after the poll, i.e. during the storage in strong rooms or during
counting, through
a.
using
press of combination of keys on CU or BU or BOTH, or
b.
Bycommunication
to CU or BU or Both via external wireless/Bluetooth/mobile phone etc.
Challenge Statement II
That
the EVMs used in the General Elections to the five States-2017 were tampered before
or during the poll day. The claimants will hence have to alter the results
in the EVMs used during these polls in exactly the same scenario as the EVMs
remain within the technical and administrative safeguards of ECI before the
poll, i.e. during the storage in strong rooms or during the poll, through
c.
using
press of combination of keys of CU or BU or Both, or
d.
by
communication to CU or BU or Both via external wireless/Bluetooth/mobile phone
etc.
Common Procedure for
Challenge I and Challenge II
1.
The
EVM Challenge is open for participation from the National and State Recognized
Political Parties only which participated in the five States' Assemblies
Elections viz. Goa, Punjab, Manipur, Uttarakhand and Uttar Pradesh.
2.
Each
National and State Recognized Party intending to participate may nominate a
maximum of 3 persons only to participate in the EVM Challenge. Each Party shall
intimate the names of maximum 3 authorized persons, if any, who wish to
accompany the chosen EVMs from the Warehouses to the Commission at New Delhi
during transportation at their own cost.
3. The
Political Parties willing to participate in the EVM Challenge must mandatorily
confirm their interest to ECI by 5.00 pm on 26th May, 2017 through
the email (evmchallenge@eci.gov.in), wherein the details of the
Nominated members must be furnished as per the prescribed Performa. Only those
Political Parties, which respond by 5.00 pm on 26th May, 2017
to the ECI, shall be allowed to participate in the EVM Challenge. The response
of the political parties shall mandatorily be made on the official letter-head
of the party duly signed by the President or General Secretary of the political
party concerned, which shall be scanned and emailed to the email id mentioned
above.
4. Further,
if the Nominees of any Political Party, to whom a Challenge date-time Slot has
been allotted, fail to report at the designated time and venue without prior
intimation or approval, shall forfeit their right to participation in the EVM
Challenge.
5. Each
Political Party will be allowed to choose a maximum of 4 EVMs of their choice
from any 4 polling stations out of the Five poll-gone States. Examples; Maximum
of 4 EVMs only form 4 polling stations can be chosen, either from one AC or
from multiple ACs in a State or from any of the five States. It is clarified
that any EVMs involved in EP (Election Petition) or those under any sealing by
the orders of a competent Court, shall not be part of this EVM Challenge. If a
Political Party does not wish to specify a particular EVM but wants ECI to
provide any EVM of Commission’s choice, then
the same should be intimated by 26th May, 2017.
6.
The
choice of the EVMs shall be emailed (evmchallenge@eci.gov.in) in
the prescribed proforma by 5.00 pm on 26th May, 2017.
7. The
chosen EVM machines, including Control Units (CU), Ballot Units (BU) (one or
more as deployed) and VVPAT (wherever deployed) shall be brought to the ECI at
New Delhi, on as-is-where basis, in compliance of the extent of established
protocol of ECI regarding opening of EVM strong-rooms/warehouse and EVM
transportation.
8. The
representatives of the Political Parties at State Level are at liberty to
witness the opening of EVM Strong-rooms at the District/AC level where the EVMs
are presently stored, inspect the machines for the various seals (as in
protocol) and accompany the machines during their transportation to ECI in
sealed trunks, if they so desire.
9. As
these EVMs were used in the recently held elections and were stored
post-counting, the EVMs would still have the candidate setting and the result
of the said election.
10.
The
results of the machines as recorded during the counting in the previous
elections shall be available in paper form also, having details like total
votes polled and votes casted for each candidates etc.
11.
A
Challenge Slot of 4 Hours shall be allotted to each participating Political
Party, wherein their registered nominees shall be given access to one of their
chosen EVMs (CU+BU + VVPAT if deployed) for the purpose of PROVING the Challenge
Statement 1 and 2. In case the first chosen EVM is in-operative as a result of
transportation, then the second of the chosen EVM shall be allowed to be used
for the challenge and so on. However, if a Political Party desires to avail of
more time, the request shall be made in writing to the Commission, which shall
decide the issue on merits and demands of reasonability.
12.
The
nominees may before proceeding for challenge if they want, check the result of
previous election already stored in CU and verify that these are same as given
by ECI in item 10 above as per ECI protocol of declaring results from CU. This
step is optional and will be recorded if they opt for it in writing. The result
of re-count also will be recorded.
13.
The
Nominees of the participating Political Parties shall be allowed the following
methods on the Challenge EVMs to prove the challenge:
a. Pressing
any sequence of buttons on the CU or BU or Both.
b. The
use of any external wireless/Bluetooth/Mobile Phone device/Transmitter.
14.
All
Key Presses made by the Challenger shall be declared prior to the actual
execution of key presses and these will manually be recorded by the ECI Counter
Staff for keeping a “written record of exact
process of conduct” of the “challenge
proving” poll. In case the
challenger wishes to use mobile or blue tooth during poll, he should inform the
Election officials and this should also be recorded. This is especially
relevant, in case the Challenger wishes to conduct any mock poll or full poll
by either use of key presses or mobile phone / blue-tooth during his tamper
attempt to prove the Challenge Statements.
15.
All
Key Presses shall be made in clear and unhindered view of the ECI Counter Staff
and the recording Cameras and made with a Specially Designed Presser, so as to
avoid any confusion or ambiguity in the key presses made by the Challenger
using his fingers.
16.
EVMs
can be opened and only visually inspected during Challenge-II as this is
allowed during First Level Check (FLC). However, EVMs cannot be opened during
Challenge- I as EVMs are always kept sealed after the Poll till counting in
actual poll scenario.
17.
During
the Challenge period, with regard to any written representation or any dispute
or interpretation issues, the decision of the ECI Officer In-charge shall be
final.
18.
The
EVM challenge shall be organised from 03.06.2017 onwards at Nirvachan
Sadan, Ashoka Road, New Delhi.
Challenge
Conclusion:
1. The
Challenger under Challenge I shall be deemed to have ''FAILED'' if:
a. The
EVM becomes non-functional after the tamper attempt made by the Challenger.
(Reason: ECI EVMs are designed to go into error mode if any unwarranted
technical operations are conducted rather than recording any wrong results).
b. The
EVM is functional and results displayed on the CU after conduct of challenge
attempt are the same as ECI declared results stored on the chosen CU (prior to
the pressing of CLEAR Button).
c. If
the Challenger violates any of the guidelines prescribed for the EVM Challenge.
d. The
challenger withdraws from current challenge.
2. The
Challenger under Challenge II shall be deemed to have ''FAILED'' if:
a. The
EVM becomes non-functional after the tamper attempt made by the Challenger.
(Reason: ECI EVMs are designed to go into error mode if any unwarranted
technical operations are conducted rather than recording any wrong results).
b. The
EVM remains functional and after erasing the earlier stored result, a mock poll
or full poll is conducted by the Challenger along with his challenge attempt
and manually recorded votes(by ECI staff) are the same as that stored on the
chosen CU after the said mock/full poll.
c. If
the Challenger violates any of the guidelines prescribed for the EVM Challenge.
d. The
challenger withdraws from current challenge.
10.
Certain naysayers have demanded that ECI should either permit them to take the
EVMs with them for tampering or allow changing of internal circuit etc. of the
EVM. This is like saying that they should be permitted to manufacture a new
machine and introduce their new EVMs in our system. Further, it is common
knowledge that changing the ‘ internal
circuit’ of any electronic device is like
changing the whole device itself, after which it is no longer the same device.
As any person with common sense will be able to appreciate, a non-ECI EVM or an
EVM with a different ‘internal circuit’ is simply a different
machineor look alike of ECI EVM hence can never be guaranteed by ECI to
give correct results. Such a scenario is completely ruled out within our
administrative safeguards and that’s
why it is not proposed in the Challenge.
11.
The Commission is thankful to all the citizens, voters, political parties and
all stakeholders for their unwavering faith in the Commission for more than 67
years. The Commission would further like to thank all political parties for showing
their continuous trust and confidence in the Election Commission of India as
expressed during interventions of political parties on 12th May in
the All Party Meeting. The Commission would like to reassure the people of the
country that the Commission would leave no stone unturned in preserving the
purity, integrity and credibility of the Elections and reinforcing the faith
and trust of the people in the electoral democracy of our country. I wish to
reassure that citizens of the country that the Commission will never ever allow
the faith of the people in the integrity of the election process to be shaken.
The Commission desire all citizens and stakeholders to remain aware ,vigilant
and alert about our electoral processes so that conduct of free and fair
election by Commission is further strengthened.
RM/VM