India-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Energy Cooperation
INDIA-U.S. JOINT STATEMENT OF 18 JULY 2005
Backgrounder
- The Joint Statement reaffirms that India-U.S. relations
are based on common values and interests. It amplifies the U.S. acknowledgement
of India as a global power and closer relations and partnership between
the two countries as being in the interest of both countries.
- The core of the commitments made by both countries
is predicated on building India-U.S. engagement and bilateral cooperation
through multifaceted actions across an entire range of issues to promote
India’s economic growth and development, including infrastructure, energy,
high technology and space, and agriculture.
- This is continuation of a process commenced by
high level interactions of successive governments in India and the United
States. Prime Minister Vajpayee’s
visit to Washington DC in November 2001 and the NSSP unveiled by him on
13th January 2004 had identified civilian
nuclear activities, civilian space programmes, and high technology trade
as key areas of bilateral co-operation. Co-operation under NSSP was
limited, however, to what was permissible under prevailing U.S. domestic
law, policies and regulations, and obligations under international regimes.
The U.S. Government has committed to adjusting all three dimensions to enable
full co-operation with India in the nuclear energy sector.
- The Joint Statement of 18th July marks
the beginning of a new basis of co-operation in these areas, particularly
full civil nuclear energy co-operation, unencumbered by the erstwhile technology
denial regime. This is expression of intent that the United States has no
desire to restrict progress in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and that
it wants to promote the full potential for co-operation.
- Cooperation between the two countries will be pursued
on the basis of reciprocity and non-discrimination. On nuclear cooperation,
a working group will steer progress in ways that build on these two principles
through a series of reciprocal steps that build on each other. This will
be an evolving process.
India’s
Benefits: India was successful in persuading the US to embark
on full civil nuclear energy cooperation, amending its domestic laws and
policies while adjusting international regimes. This ends a policy of targeting Indian programmes that has been
in place since 1974. We not only
secured fuel for Tarapur and opened up the possibility of fuel supply for other
safeguarded reactors, but also got the US to refrain from vetoing fuel supplies
by other countries (Russia, France) as
it had in the past. The US also agreed
to consider Indian participation in the ITER fusion programme and the
Generation-IV advanced reactors that represent frontier areas in nuclear
technology. Our scientists will, as a
result, no longer be denied opportunities in global nuclear research
programmes. There is also an explicit recognition of India as ‘a responsible
state with advanced nuclear technology’.
India’s
Obligations: In return, India accepted the same responsibilities
and practices as other states with advanced nuclear technology. These include identifying and separating
civilian and military facilities in a phased manner, placing its civilian
facilities under IAEA safeguards and signing an IAEA Additional Protocol. A number of existing policies were also
reiterated by India, among them a unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing,
working towards conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty,
non-transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies, securing nuclear
materials and technology through export control and harmonisation with MTCR and
NSG guidelines.
Separation
and Capping: Separation
of civilian and military facilities has been undertaken by nuclear weapon
states, each in its own way. They have
gone on to also declare to differing extent their civilian facilities to
IAEA. In the case of US alone, the
number of such facilities exceeds to 200.
The identification and separation of Indian facilities would be done by
the Government of India. National
security considerations would dictate this. Some quarters have sought to
portray the separation as leading to a capping of our strategic
programmes. This is completely
untrue. It is entirely for India to
decide which facilities are of military significance. These will remain outside
the purview of international inspections and scrutiny. The size of our deterrent will be determined
in accordance with our own assessment of our security interests and this will
be appropriately reflected in identification of military facilities.
Flexibility: An argument has been made that separation
into civilian and military programmes will rob India of flexibility if that is
required by unanticipated circumstances.
Nuclear weapon states, including the US, have the right to shift
facilities from civilian category to military and there is no reason why this
should not apply to India. This also
addresses possible concerns on capping.
Reciprocity: The Joint Statement clearly states that
India’s commitment is reciprocal. If
the United States does not fulfil its obligations, there is no pressure on
India to do so either. Therefore, there
may be no apprehension that India would be bound by the understanding even if
the US side cannot deliver on its part.
Moreover, India’s obligation to undertake separation is qualified as
being conducted in a phased manner.
That would allow adequate verification of action taken on the US side
before India takes reciprocal measures.
Additional
Protocol: This is actually more relevant to non-nuclear weapon
states undertaking clandestine programmes than to declared weapon states. All
five NPT nuclear weapon states have signed the Additional Protocol and three of
them (China, France and UK) have allowed it to come into force. We have only agreed to an additional protocol and, therefore, there need not be anxieties
about its impact on India. It may also
be noted that such Protocols are negotiated by the nuclear weapon states with
IAEA and include specific provisions reflecting the national characteristics of
the programme.
Fissile
Material Cut-off: The Joint Statement reiterates
the existing policy of working towards a multilateral Fissile Material Cut-off
Treaty. There is no commitment at all
to cease production of fissile material ahead of the conclusion of such a
multilateral treaty.
The
agreement reached during PM’s visit promises to put an end to three decades of
nuclear technology denial to India. It
could provide us nuclear fuel that is necessary if we are to expand our
civilian nuclear programmes. A major
expansion in civilian nuclear power will be facilitated through international
cooperation. The framework for such cooperation has been agreed to in the Joint
Statement. India has accepted
responsibilities in a strictly non-discriminatory manner (i.e. the same as
other nuclear weapon states). Our
strategic programmes have been fully protected while evolving a new
arrangement. This has been done in a
risk free manner and if US fails to deliver, India too has every right to
refrain from implementing its obligations.
In the past, India faced pressure on its strategic programmes as a
pre-condition for international cooperation on civilian nuclear energy. On this occasion, we have achieved our goals
without any dilution of commitment to the strategic programmes. This sets the
stage for a significant growth in our civilian nuclear energy sector that would
address our acute energy shortage and provide the basis for accelerated Indian
economic growth rate.
FAQs on
the India-US Joint Statement
Q: What is the
significance of the agreement between India and the United States for civilian
nuclear energy cooperation as reflected in the Joint Statement?
A: The Joint Statement reflects the
preparedness, on the part of the U.S. Government, to begin a process of
dismantling the restrictive technology denial regime that restricted India’s
access to nuclear technology and materials for India not having joined the
Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. The United States has committed to take
certain steps, nationally and internationally, working with Congress and
together with its allies, to remove restrictions imposed on our access to
civilian nuclear technology, equipment and materials. India, in turn, has
committed to taking reciprocally exactly the same steps that other nuclear
weapon States have taken.
Q: Does the
commitments made by the United States amount to recognition of India as a
nuclear weapon State?
A. The agreement between India and the
United States is not about nuclear weapon status. The steps that the two
countries have reciprocally agreed to take should be seen as essential steps
for broadening our cooperation in civilian nuclear sector. We look upon this
agreement as a recognition of India’s accomplishments in the peaceful uses of
atomic energy.
Q: Why can the
United States not commence civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India
immediately?
A: U.S. domestic laws and the commitments
that it has undertaken as part of its membership of Nuclear Suppliers Group
restrict such cooperation at this stage. However, the U.S. Government has
committed itself, at the highest level, to work to achieve full civil nuclear
energy cooperation with India, taking into account India’s growing energy
requirements, the impact of Indian energy needs on global environment in case
it is mostly dependent on fossil fuels, the crucial role consequently of
nuclear energy in our desired energy mix, the advanced state of India’s
capabilities in the nuclear sector, India’s responsible behaviour and its
impeccable anti-proliferation record.
Q: How will the
understanding reached by the two countries be implemented?
A: The actions to be undertaken by the
United States and India are clearly enumerated in the Joint Statement, which
both sides are committed to implement as soon as possible. These will be
strictly reciprocal. India will implement its steps in phases.
Q: What were
the specific impediments to such cooperation on the part of the United States?
A: The U.S. Atomic Energy Act (AEA) of
1954, as amended by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA) of 1978
categorises India as a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS) and, hence, subject to
full scope safeguards. Similarly, NSG
guidelines specify that nuclear reactors and material can be supplied to
non-nuclear weapons States, defined under NPT, only under full scope
safeguards. For full civil nuclear
energy cooperation, involving transfers of nuclear equipment, technology and
materials, an India-U.S. agreement on nuclear cooperation (like the agreement
of 1963) and modifications to NSG guidelines, are required. President Bush has
committed to seek agreement from the U.S. Congress to adjust U.S. laws and
policies, as also to work towards adjusting international regimes, in this
regard.
Q: What was the
basis of India-U.S. cooperation on civilian nuclear energy cooperation in the
past?
A: India and the United States had signed
an agreement on Civil Uses of Atomic Energy on August 8, 1963 in Washington DC
and the agreement entered into force for a period of 30 years on October 25,
1963. The Tarapur Atomic Power Station was set up as a result of U.S. assistance. After the nuclear test in 1974, differences
cropped up and eventually the U.S. withdrew from the agreement.
Q: Has India
remained under a U.S.-inspired technology denial regime? How much progress on
civilian nuclear energy cooperation been made in recent years?
A: Economic, defence and
technology-related sanctions imposed on India following the nuclear weapon
tests in May 1998 were lifted in September 2001. However, certain long standing restrictive policies on transfer
of sensitive nuclear and missile technologies to India remain in place. The U.S. side also maintains the so-called
Entity List, which places the organisation listed therein to tighter export
controls. Although the Entity List has
been pruned down from 159 organisations, it still remains in double digits
(they include Department of Atomic Energy’s BARC; Indira Gandhi Atomic research
Centre; Indian Rare Earth; all nuclear facilities, Bharat Dynamics Limited and
DRDO’s Solid State Physics Laboratory). A number of Indian organisations have
been taken off the Entity List since 18th July 2005 and India
believes that the remaining organisations should also be removed from that list
expeditiously.
There was
some progress on civilian nuclear energy cooperation since the lifting of sanctions
in September 2001. India and the United
States initiated five safety related projects for safeguarded nuclear
facilities. Exchange of visits by U.S.
and Indian nuclear regulatory officials also commenced. The United States conveyed in November 2002
that it would follow a policy of favourable consideration for export of
unilaterally controlled ‘balance of plants’ equipment and components (the
non-nuclear cycle) for safeguarded nuclear facilities. The United States
offered consultations, training and certain components required for personnel
and environment protection against radiation for safeguarded nuclear reactions.
It also offered India’s membership of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
research groups developing accident analysis software.
We hope to
make significant progress in this area through modification in existing U.S.
regulations, in the spirit of the new relationship and the shared commitment to
qualitatively transform bilateral relations.
Q: How can
Government describe the commitments in Joint Statement as ‘significant’?
A: The commitments are significant because
they demonstrate U.S. willingness to move away from highly restrictive policies
put in place after the nuclear tests, going all the way back to 1974, and seek
ways to meet India’s requirements of developing civilian nuclear sector. It has
also committed to work with its friends and allies to adjust the international
regime.
Q: Has the
United States pressed India to make compromises on its nuclear and missile
programmes in order to make progress on civilian nuclear energy cooperation??
Has India undermined its nuclear deterrent? Is this a backdoor to push India
towards signing the NPT?
A: The issue of India’s nuclear weapons or
NPT has not been raised in our dialogue with the United States. Our dialogue is
predicated on India maintaining its strategic programme. Our nuclear deterrent cannot be subject of
negotiations with foreign governments and is strictly within our sovereign
domain. India has rejected demands for joining the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon
State. However, India has always remained committed to the non-proliferation
and disarmament objectives of the treaty. Our record on non-proliferation is
impeccable and development of our nuclear-weapon capability has not diminished
our commitment to non-discriminatory global disarmament.
Q: What other
conditions have the U.S. Government imposed on India?
A: There are no conditions on either side.
Understandings have been clearly spelt out in the joint statement. We have agreed
to clearly articulated reciprocal steps. We believe progress on civilian
nuclear cooperation stands on its own merit in the context of the shared desire
of the two countries to transform bilateral relations and develop a long-term
and closer partnership.
Q: Will such
cooperation adversely affect India’s nuclear deterrent?
A: Cooperation in the sectors of civilian
nuclear energy and outer space between India and the United States is
predicated on India maintaining its indigenous nuclear and missile programmes
and the commitments made by India will have no impact whatsoever on our minimum
credible nuclear deterrent.
Q: Does India
have to take specific steps before the United States makes any moves?
A: The Joint Statement talks about steps
to be taken reciprocally. These steps will build on each other. These steps
will be discussed in the Working Group.
Q: The U.S.
offer is vague and seems on a best-endeavour basis, while India’s commitments
are cast in iron. Isn’t there an imbalance between the obligations assumed?
A: The public affirmation by the U.S.
President of its commitments has the same status as the commitment by India to
take certain reciprocal steps.
India’s
nuclear policy is one of restraint, responsibility and defensive orientation
and India has assumed the same obligations as the other nuclear weapon States.
These obligations are in conformity with our long-standing policy on
non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, related materials, equipment and
technology and the means of their delivery. Nuclear energy is to play a
critical role in ensuring our energy security, and the United States,
recognizing the importance of nuclear energy in meeting our energy demands, has
committed to certain steps in order to step-up cooperation in the civilian
nuclear sector by working to lift restrictions faced by India within the
domestic US law and international export control regime like NSG.
Q: Since the
military programme in India is only a small part of the overall nuclear
programme, will not the separation of the civilian and military facilities
increase costs for India?
A: There is no question of any increased
or infructuous expenditure since a military facility can also continue to do
civilian work, as indeed is the case in the nuclear weapon States. While no
weapons related work can be carried out in a civilian facility, there is no bar
whatsoever on civilian work being done in a military facility.
Q: Will the
separation of civilian and military facilities not imply that India will open
all its nuclear reactors to inspection, including challenge inspection, or
anytime-anywhere inspection that is part of the Model Additional Protocol?
A: India will not accede to full-scope
safeguards. IAEA safeguards shall apply to facilities to be designated by India
voluntarily. India will also negotiate an Additional Protocol with IAEA
applicable to the designated civilian facilities. In this respect there will be
no discrimination between India and other Nuclear Weapon States.
Q: Does the
separation of military and civilian nuclear facilities not automatically create
a cap on India’s fissile material production?
A: No. The designation of civilian
facilities will be based on our assessment and decision and it will take into
account the requirements of maintaining a credible minimum deterrent to fully
safeguard our security interests. We will ensure that there will be no shortage
of fissile materials for our strategic programmes.
Q: By agreeing
to work with the United States on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, are we
still not accepting a cap on our fissile material production?
A: India has a long-standing commitment to
negotiating multilateral FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and
the joint statement just reflects that commitment. We have not accepted any
unilateral moratorium on fissile material production before FMCT is negotiated
and enters into force for all countries.
Q. How will the
agreement with the United States help in nuclear cooperation with other
countries?
A. President Bush has promised to work
with the friends and allies of the United States to adjust international
regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India.
The removal of the restrictions currently imposed by NSG will enable India to
obtain nuclear technology, material and equipment for civilian nuclear sector
internationally. Restrictions on India will be fully removed. India will join a
select group of countries possessing such advanced research capabilities.
YSR/DS/SKS
(Release ID :10719)