In August 1999, the IAF which is responsible for
carrying out VVIP communication task, proposed the replacement of Mi-8 VIP
helicopters due to severe operational constraints, such as, inability of Mi-8
to operate at night and in adverse weather, inability to operate safely at
places in elevation beyond 2000 meters etc. IAF felt the need for the
replacement of Mi-8 helicopters as they were completing their total technical
life.
2. A global RFP
was issued in March 2002 to which 4 vendors responded. The Technical Evaluation
Committee shortlisted 3 helicopters and accordingly flight evaluations were
conducted. Since, EH-101 of M/s. AgustaWestland
was not certified for an altitude of 6000 meters, it did not participate in the
flight evaluation. The Russian helicopter Mi-172 could not comply with 7
mandatory Operational Requirements (ORs).
After flight evaluation, EC-225 of M/s. Eurocopter, France was found
suitable for acquisition.
3. On November
19, 2003 a meeting was taken by Principal Secretary to PM on this subject. In the meeting, Principal Secretary observed
that his main concern was that the framing of the mandatory requirements has
led us effectively into a single vendor situation. It was also noted that PM and President have
rarely made visits to places involving flying at an altitude beyond 4500
meters. In the meeting it was decided to
make the mandatory requirement for operational altitude 4500 meters. The higher flying ceiling of 6000 meters, and
a cabinet height of 1.8 meters could be made desirable operational
requirements. It was observed that
with these revisions, several helicopters which otherwise met all requirements
but had been rejected due to the altitude restriction, would now come into the
reckoning.
4. The meeting
was followed by a letter dated 22nd December, 2003 from the Principal
Secretary to PM to the Air Chief, stating that it was unfortunate that neither
PMO nor SPG was consulted while framing these mandatory requirements. He suggested that CAS and Defence Secretary may
jointly review the matter to draw up realistic mandatory requirements
satisfying operational, security and convenience requirements of VVIPs and also
set in motion a fast track process for selection and acquisition of the
replacement helicopters.
5. In pursuance
of the above directive, the ORs were deliberated at length between IAF, NSA,
SPG/PMO and MoD between March, 2005 to September, 2006 and the above indicated
changes were incorporated.
6. The required
numbers of helicopters for the entourage of VVIP was further deliberated
between Air HQ, MoD and SPG/PMO. The quantity of helicopters proposed for
procurement was revised from 8 to 12 helicopters by adding 4 helicopters in
non-VIP configuration for security reasons.
7. The AON for
the procurement of 12 helicopters was accorded by the Defence Acquisition
Council under ‘Buy’ category with 30 percent offsets on 3rd January,
2006. RFP was issued to 6 vendors on 27th
September, 2006.
8.
Three
vendors, namely M/s Sikorsky, USA (S-92 helicopter), M/s AgustaWestland, UK (EH-101 helicopter)
and M/s. Rosoboronexport, Russia (Mi-172 helicopter) responded to the RFP.
9.
M/s.
Rosoboronexport did not submit earnest
money deposit and the Integrity Pact, along with their Technical and Commercial
proposals. It had been made clear to M/s Rosoboronexport in February 2007 that
this was a global tender and hence every contractual clause would be the same
for all vendors. As no Integrity Pact
and Earnest Money Deposit were received from M/s Rosoboronexport, their Techno-Commercial
offer was not accepted.
10.
The
Technical Evaluation Committee evaluated the technical proposals of M/s
Sikorsky and M/s AgustaWestland and recommended field evaluation trials of
their helicopters.
11.
The
Field Evaluation Trial of M/s AgustaWestland was carried out in UK and trials
of M/s Sikorsky were carried out in USA from 16 January 2008 to February
2008. The Field Evaluation Trial team
submitted its report in April 2008 and recommended AW-101 helicopter of M/s
AgustaWestland for induction into Service.
SPG was also part of the Field Evaluation Trial team.
12.
The
Staff Evaluation Report of Air HQ concluded that the S-92 helicopter was
non-compliant with respect to four SQRs for the VVIP helicopter (Missile
Approach Warning System, Service Ceiling of 4.5 km, Drift Down Altitude and
Hover Out of Ground Effect). The
Staff Evaluation Report assessed the VVIP helicopter AW-101 to be fully
compliant with all SQRs.
13.
Technical
Oversight Committee constituted on 6 August 2008 found that the field evaluation
trials, compliance to SQRs and selection of vendors were done according to the
prescribed procedures.
14.
Contract
Negotiation Committee (CNC) was constituted and it carried out its discussions
with the vendor between 19 September 2008 and 21 January, 2009. While the CNC was progressing its
discussions, Air HQ, recommended inclusion of Traffic Collusion Avoidance
System (TCAS-II) and Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System (EGPWS) for all
12 helicopters and SPG/PMO recommended inclusion of Medevac System for 8 VVIP
helicopters. These additional equipment
were considered to be essential for safe and effective operation of the
helicopter in VVIP transportation role.
SPG also agreed to these requirements.
The CNC, thereafter, recommended conclusion of the contract at a
negotiated price of EURO 556.262 million.
15.
On
completion of CNC the proposal was submitted for approval of the Cabinet
Committee on Security (CCS). The CCS
considered the proposal in its meeting held on 18 January 2010 and approved the
proposal.
16.
In
pursuance of the decision of the CCS the Ministry of Defence concluded a
contract for the supply of 12 AW-101 VVIP helicopter with M/s AgustaWestland,
UK on 08 February, 2010.
17.
The
procurement case was, thus, progressed in accordance with the established
procurement procedure in a transparent manner with all stages of procurement
being followed meticulously. Security aspects as required by SPG/PMO and
IAF were fully taken into consideration. The role of PMO which began in 2003 was to ensure
that security, communication and other requirements of VVIP security were taken
care of and the helicopter for VVIP use is selected on the basis of broad based
QRs.
18. Contract signed with
M/s. AgustaWestland includes specific contractual provisions against bribery
and the use of undue influence. Article
22 of the contract deals with penalty for use of undue influence. This clause entitles the ‘Buyer’ to cancel
the contract with the ‘Seller’ and recover from him the amount of any loss
arising from such cancellation. Article
23 of the contract dealing with agents and agency commission requires the ‘Seller’
to confirm and declare that he has not engaged any individual or firm, whether
Indian or foreign, whosoever, to intercede, facilitate or in any way to
recommend to the Government of India or any of its functionaries, whether
officially or unofficially, to award of the contract to the ‘Seller’ nor has any
amount been paid, promised or intended to be paid to any such individual or firm
in respect of any such intercession, facilitation or recommendation. This clause further entitles the ‘Buyer’ to
consider cancellation of the contract without any entitlement or compensation
to the ‘Seller’ who shall be liable to refund all payments made by the ‘Buyer’
in terms of the contract along with interest.
19. In addition to the above
contractual provisions, M/s. Agusta Westland has signed an Integrity Pact with
the Government. The validity of this
Integrity Pact is from the date of its signing and extends up to five years or
the complete execution of the contract whichever is later. Under the Integrity Pact, the bidder commits
himself to take all measures necessary to prevent corrupt practices, unfair
means and illegal activities during any stage of the bid or during any
pre-contract or post-contract stage. Any
breach of the provisions of the Integrity Pact entitles the ‘Buyer’ to take
actions against the ‘Seller’ which includes forfeiture of the earnest money,
performance bond, cancellation of the contract without giving any compensation,
to recover all the sums already paid with interest, to cancel any other
contracts with the bidder and to debar the bidder from entering into any bid
from the Government for a minimum period of five years which may be extended, etc.
20. As regards,
the allegations of unethical dealings in helicopter procurement case including
involvement of middleman and payment of bribes etc., the first report in the
media appeared in February 2012.
21.
Immediately (the next day after the news item appeared in the
papers) DG(Acq) in MoD sought a factual report in the matter from our Embassy
in Rome.
22.
MoD
also noted the report in the
‘Hindu’ of 28.2.2012 that, quoting Finmeccanica, states that its subsidiary
AgustaWestland is not involved in “any irregularity in the deal”.
23.
Subsequently, MoD received more than one communication from M/s
AgustaWestland confirming that the statements in the press are “completely unfounded and have been issued with
malicious intent” and that “no commissions whatsoever were paid” in the case.
24.
In
April 2012, MoD wrote again to our Embassy in Rome seeking an update.
25.
A
detailed report on the status of the case was received from our Embassy in Rome
in May 2012. The report made it clear
that there are inherent difficulties in obtaining formal details of the case
given the independence of the judiciary from the executive in Italy.
26.
MoD
in July 2012 wrote to our embassy in Rome stating that it could approach the concerned judicial authorities directly. A formal request was indeed made by the
embassy to the Naples prosecutors office on July 16, 2012.
27.
Since
factual information was difficult to arrive at, Defence Secretary wrote to
Secretary (West), MEA, in October 2012 reiterating the importance of the need
to get information from the Italian authorities so that MoD could take further
necessary action in this regard.
28.
MEA’s
response again was that the matter had been taken up with the Italian side and
the position conveyed for the need for ‘reliable information’, for “news
reports alone could not be the basis for the Ministry of Defence to make any
preliminary determination”.
29.
In
October 2012 Defence Secretary also wrote to Secretary (West) to take up the
matter with the Government of U.K. in
view of the alleged involvement of a British citizen and the fact that the contract
was signed with M/s AgustaWestland, U.K.
30.
In
November 2012, Secretary (West), MEA, replied to Defence Secretary stating that
‘the U.K. authorities were waiting for the results of the Italian investigation
in order to ascertain whether there are further actions to take’.
31.
Earlier,
in connection with the letter received from one
Mr. Edmund Allen of Ganton Limited, USA, MoD had written on 19.4.12 to CBI
and Enforcement Directorate for necessary action, as Abhishek Verma and
others were also being named in various media reports in connection with
several defence deals. Later,
Enforcement Directorate informed MoD in July 2012 that they were enquiring into
the allegations.
32.
In
November 2012, a letter was received in MoD from the Director, Income Tax
(Investigations) regarding allegations against Indians possibly involved in the
deal as middlemen and seeking information about them. The current status of the case was conveyed
to the income tax authorities in January 2013; in return, MoD asked
Income Tax to share with it any ‘credible information’.
33.
Throughout
the process of this case, MoD has been prompt to take action on newspaper
reports, and to seek factual information from the concerned authorities. Since foreign governments are involved, MoD
has consistently pursued the matter though MEA.
34.
As
soon as information was available of one concrete step having been taken by the
concerned foreign investigative authorities, namely, the arrest of Mr. Giuseppe
Orsi, CEO, Finmeccanica on Feb 12, 2013. MoD handed over the case to CBI for
investigation and put on hold all further payments to Agusta Westland. Besides this, the Indian Embassy has been
requested to provide the factual position and any other relevant
information. The CEO of M/s
AgustaWestland has also been asked to categorically state the clear position in
view of the current developments indicating specifically
if any financial transaction has taken place with any Indian individual /
entity which would be violative of the Integrity Pact or any other terms and
conditions of the contract.
35.
As
already mentioned above, both the contract and integrity pact signed with M/s
AgustaWestland, U.K., contain specific provisions by which strict action
including cancellation of contract, recovery of payment, blacklisting and penal
action can be taken against the vendors.
Government is determined to take all possible legal and administrative
action against the guilty parties and accordingly has ordered a thorough probe
by CBI.
Sitanshu Kar