Press Note
1. The Election Commission has observed that after
declaration of result of the recently held General Elections to the State
Legislative Assemblies of Goa, Manipur, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand,
some political parties have raised voice against the credibility of the
ECI-EVMs, alleging tampering of EVMs during the said elections. One
representation was received from National General Secretary, BSP without any
specific allegation on 11.03.2017. ECI on 11.03.2017 itself has given detailed
response to BSP rejecting the representation. ECI’s reply is available at www.eci.nic.in.
2. Such concerns, about alleged tamperability of ECI-EVM
have been raised earlier also since their introduction including before HC/SC. These
allegations have been dismissed. ECI unequivocally reiterate that given
effective technical and administrative safeguards, EVMs are not temperable and
integrity of electoral process is preserved.
3. It will be useful to once again recapture some facts on
the subject for information of citizens and all concerned.
4. Background of EVM
With a view to overcome certain problems associated with use of
ballot papers and taking advantage of development of technology so that voters
cast their votes correctly without any resultant ambiguity and removing the
possibilities of invalid votes totally, the Commission in December, 1977 mooted
the idea of EVM. The law was amended by the Parliament in December, 1988 and a
new section 61A was inserted in the Representation of the People Act, 1951
empowering the Commission to use voting machines. The amended provision came
into force w.e.f. 15th March, 1989.
Central
Government appointed the Electoral Reforms Committee in January, 1990
consisting of representative of several recognized National and State Parties.
The Electoral Reforms Committee further constituted a technical Expert
Committee for the evaluation of the electronic voting machines. The Committee
came to conclusion that the electronic voting machine is a secure system. The
expert committee, therefore, unanimously recommended in April, 1990 the use of
the electronic voting machines without further loss of time.
5. Since 2000, EVMs
have been used in 107 General Elections to State Legislative Assemblies and 3
General Elections to Lok Sabha held in 2004, 2009 & 2014.
6. Judicial
Pronouncements on use of EVMs-
The issue of possible
tampering of EVM has been raised before various High Courts since 2001 as mentioned
below:-
(a) Madras High
Court-2001
(b) Delhi High Court-2004
(c) Karnataka High
Court- 2004
(d) Kerala High Court-2002
(e) Bombay High
Court (Nagpur Bench)-2004
All the above
High Courts after going into all aspects of the technological soundness and the
administrative measures involved in the use of EVMs at elections in India, have
held that the EVMs in India are credible, reliable and totally tamperproof. In
some of these cases, even Supreme Court has dismissed appeals filed by some
petitioners against High Court orders.
The Hon’ble Karnataka High
Court held that “This invention is undoubtedly a great achievement in the
electronic and computer technology and a national pride”. Both the Karnataka
High Court and the Madras High Court observed that use of EVMs in election has
several advantages over the system of ballot paper/ballot box election. The
Hon’ble Madras High Court also categorically ruled out any question of tampering
of the EVMs. The following observations made by the Madras High Court may be
taken note of.
“There is also no question
of introducing any virus or bugs for the reason that the EVMs cannot be
compared to personal computers. The programming in computers, as suggested,
has no bearing with the EVMs. The computer would have inherent limitations
having connections through Internet and by their very design, they may allow
the alteration of the programme but the EVMs are independent units and the
programme in EVM is entirely a different system.”
In one of the cases, the Hon’ble
High Court of Kerala in its order dated 6.2.2002 had recorded its appreciation
on the efficiency of the mechanism. The judgment of the Kerala High Court in
the said Election Petition was upheld by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Civil
Appeal (AIR 2003 SC 2271).
It is admitted before
various courts that the data or technique brought in use in EVM in India were
not subject to piracy as nobody knows anything about the contents of any type
or has any unauthorized or free access to EVM.
Thereafter, the
controversy was raised by political parties again after 2009 General Elections
to House of People stating that EVMs were not fool proof and provide scope for
manipulation. However, no specific allegation was raised nor could they prove
before any court of law.
Some activists approached Supreme Court in 2009 which
advised them to go to ECI. It was then these activists opened dialogue and ECI
threw open challenge to anyone to demonstrate how machine owned by ECI can be
tempered. However, in spite of opportunities given by ECI, machines opened and
internal components shown, no one could demonstrate any tempering with the
machine in ECI HQ. There proceedings were videographed.
In an extraordinary measure, the Commission invited those who had
expressed reservations about the Electronic Voting Machine (EVM) to come and
demonstrate the points made in their allegations from 3rd to 8th August 2009.
Those invited included political parties, petitioners before various courts and
some individuals who had been writing to the Commission on this issue. One
hundred EVMs brought from ten states namely, Andhra Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat,
Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu and Uttar
Pradesh, were kept at the Commission’s office in readiness for scrutiny and for
any application to establish its alleged fallibility. The EVMs were offered for
such demonstration in the presence of a technical experts group as well as engineers
representing the EVM manufacturers, BEL and ECIL. The outcome of this exercise
is that none of the persons, who were given the opportunity, could actually
demonstrate any tamper ability of the ECI-EVMs. They either failed or chose not
to demonstrate.
Some activists then showed
on TV channel a ‘machine’ which they claimed can be manipulated. ECI countered
allegation that the ‘machine’ was stolen from EVM warehouse in Mumbai,
subjected to changes by activists and thus it was no longer the ‘machine’ used by
ECI.
In 2010, all political
parties except a few from Assam and Tamil Nadu in a meeting convened by ECI
expressed satisfaction about the functioning of EVMs. At this stage, idea of
VVPAT was moved for further exploration.
In 2009, in a
case before Delhi High Court, all earlier allegations about EVM temperabilities
were raised. However, Delhi High Court satisfied with detailed reply of ECI why
EVM cannot be rigged and about ECI efforts on developing VVPAT decided and
disposed of the case in 2012 that VVPAT may be developed early in consultation
with political parties.
7. Technical Security of EVMs used by ECI
(a)
The machine is
electronically protected to prevent any tampering/manipulation. The programme
(software) used in these machines is burnt into a One Time Programmable
(OTP)/Masked chip so that it cannot be altered or tampered with. Further these
machines are not networked either by wire or by wireless to any other machine
or system. Therefore, there is no possibility of its data corruption.
(b)
The software of EVMs is
developed in-house by a selected group of Engineers in BEL (Defense Ministry
PSU) and ECIL (Atomic Energy Ministry’s PSU) independently from each other. A
select software development group of 2-3 engineers designs the source code and
this work is not sub-contracted.
(c)
After completion of
software design, testing and evaluation of the software is carried out by an
independent testing group as per the software requirements specifications
(SRS). This ensures that the software has really been written as per the
requirements laid down for its intended use only.
(d)
After successful
completion of such evaluation, machine code of the source programme code is
given to the micro controller manufacturer for writing in the micro controllers.
From this machine code, the source code cannot be read. Source code is never
handed over to anyone outside the software group of PSUs.
(e)
Micro controller
manufacturer initially provides engineering samples to PSUs for evaluation.
These samples are assembled into the EVM, evaluated and verified for
functionality at great length. Bulk production clearance by PSU is given to
micro controller manufacturer only after successful completion of this
verification.
(f)
The source code for the
EVM is stored under controlled conditions at all times. Checks and balances are
in place to ensure that it is accessible to authorized personnel only.
(g)
During production in
the factory, functional testing is done by production group as per the laid
down Quality plan and performance test procedures.
(h)
The software is so
designed that it allows a voter to cast the vote only once. The vote can be
recorded by an elector from the ballot unit only after the Presiding Officer
enables the ballot on the Control Unit. The machine does not receive any signal
from outside at any time. The next vote can be recorded only after the
Presiding Officer enables the ballot on the Control Unit. In between, the
machine becomes dead to any signal from outside (except from the Control Unit).
(i)
Samples of EVMs from
production batches are regularly checked for functionality by Quality Assurance
Group, which is an independent unit within the PSUs.
(j)
Certain additional
features were introduced in 2006 in ECI-EVMs such as dynamic coding between Ballot
Unit (BU) and Control Unit (CU), installation of real time clock,
installation of full display system and date and time stamping of every
key-pressing in EVM.
(k)
Technical Evaluation
Committee in 2006 has concluded that any tempering of CU by coded signals by
wireless or outside or Bluetooth or WiFi is ruled out as CU does not have high
frequency receiver and data decoder. CU accepts only specially encrypted and
dynamically coded data from BU. Data from any outside source cannot be accepted
by CU.
8. Uniqueness
of ECI-EVMs
Some political parties have stated that some foreign
countries have stopped using EVMs. The Commission has come across comparisons
between ECI-EVM and EVMs used by foreign countries. Such comparisons
are both misplaced and misguided. ECI EVMs are Stand alone Machine. Therefore
ECI-EVMs cannot be compared with machines of other countries.
(a) Most of the systems used in other countries
are Computer based with internet connectivity. Hence, these could be vulnerable
to hacking.
(b) As stated above, the software in the
ECI-EVM chip is one time programmable (OTP) and burnt into the chip at the time
of manufacture. Nothing can be written on the chip after manufacture. Thus the
ECI-EVMs are fundamentally different from the voting machines and processes
adopted in various foreign countries.
(c) Any surmise based on foreign studies or
operating system based EVMs used elsewhere would be completely erroneous. The
ECI-EVMs cannot be compared with those EVMs.
9. Procedural
and Administrative Securities
The Commission has put in place
an elaborate administrative system of security measures and procedural
checks-and-balances aimed at prevention of any possible misuse or procedural
lapses. These safeguards are implemented by ECI transparently with the active
and documented involvement of political parties, candidates and their
representatives at every stage to build their confidence on efficacy and
reliability of EVMs. These safeguards are:
(a)
Before every
election, a first level checking (FLC) is done for every EVM to be used in the
election by the engineers of the manufacturers in the presence of political
parties’ representatives. Any malfunctioning EVM is kept separately and is
not used in the election.
(b)
Manufacturers
certify at the time of FLC that all components in the EVM are original. After
this, the plastic cabinet of Control Unit of the EVM is sealed using a “Pink
Paper Seal”, which is signed by representatives of political parties and
stored in strong rooms. After this stage, the plastic cabinet of control unit
of the EVMs cannot be opened. There is no access to any component of inside of
EVMs.
(c)
Additionally, at
the time of FLC, at least 1000 votes are cast by the representatives of
political parties on 5%of EVMs randomly selected by them. A printout of the
results of this mock poll as well as a sequential print out of every vote
polled during the mock poll at the time of First Level Checking of EVMs are
taken out for at least 5% of EVMs and shown to the representatives of political
parties. Representatives of political parties are allowed to pick machines
randomly for this purpose. In rest of the machines, numbers of votes polled
during the mock poll are to the satisfaction of the representatives of
political parties. Representatives of political parties are allowed to do
mock poll themselves. It is all documented by DEOs/ROs.
(d)
Subsequently, stored
EVMs are randomized by computer software twice once for allocation of
machines to assembly constituencies and second to polling stations in the
presence of candidates or their representatives before they are distributed for
use in individual polling stations. Such lists of EVM containing serial
number of EVM allocated to particular polling station are provided to the
political parties/candidates.
(e)
Candidates and
their representatives are allowed to conduct mock polls on EVMs at the time of
candidate setting and also before the actual poll on the poll day to satisfy
themselves about the satisfactory functioning of EVMs being used.
(f)
Once the candidate
setting is done, the Ballot Unit of the EVM is also sealed with thread/Pink
Paper seals so that nobody has access to the inside of the Ballot Unit too.
These Pink seals also bear signatures of representatives of political
parties/candidate.
(g)
A printout of the
results of mock poll as well as a sequential print out of every vote polled
during the mock poll at the time of Preparation of EVMs and candidate setting
are also taken out for at least 5% of EVMs and shown to the representatives
of political parties. Representatives of political parties are allowed to pick
machines randomly for this purpose.
(h)
On the poll day, a
mock poll by casting at least 50 votes is conducted at every polling station in
the presence of the representatives of the candidates/polling agents with their
signature and a mock-poll certificate to that effect is obtained from every
Presiding Officer.
(i)
After the mock poll
is over, another thread seal and green paper seals are put on the EVM to block
access to all buttons on the EVM, except those, which are used for the conduct
of poll. These paper seals and thread seals are allowed to be signed by the
polling agents. After the poll is over, the Presiding officer presses the
“Close” button on the EVM in the presence of polling agents. Thereafter, no
votes can be polled in the EVM.
(j)
After this, the
entire EVM is sealed. Candidates and their agents are allowed to put their
signatures on the seals, which they can check for the intactness of the
seal before counting. Candidates/representatives travel behind vehicles carrying
EVMs from polling stations to counting storage rooms.
(k)
In addition to this,
the strong rooms where EVMs are stored, for counting are also sealed and
watched round the clock. The candidates and their representatives are
allowed to put their own seals on the strong rooms. They are also allowed to keep
a watch round the clock on the strong room. Security forces are deployed in
multiple layers around storage rooms.
(l)
The representatives
of candidates of all political parties are given opportunity to participate in
FLC, Preparation of EVMs before poll, mock poll, etc.
10. VOTER VERIFIABLE PAPER AUDIT TRAIL (VVPAT)
ECI based on consultation with political parties in 2010
considered to explore use of Voter Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) with a
view to enhance transparency. Introduction of VVPAT implied that a paper slip
is generated bearing name and symbol of the candidate along with recording of
vote in Control Unit, so that in case of any dispute, paper slip could be
counted to verify the result being shown on the EVM. Under VVPAT, a printer is
attached to the balloting Unit and kept in the voting compartment. The paper
slip remains visible on VVPAT for 07 seconds through a transparent window.
Design of VVPAT made by BEL/ECIL was approved by ECI in 2013 and shown to
persons who were pursuing matters in the Supreme Court. Rules were amended. ECI
used VVPAT in Nagaland bye election in 2013 which proved great success. SC
ordered introduction of VVPAT in phases and asked Government to sanction funds
for procurement.
In this regard in June 2014, the Commission proposed to
implement VVPAT at every polling station in the next General Election to Lok
Sabha due in 2019 and asked for fund of Rs. 3174 cr from the Government.
Hon’ble Supreme Court also permitted the ECI to implement VVPATs in phase
manner.
In an ongoing case in the Supreme Court, Commission in
the month of March 2017, has intimated the apex court that ECI will get
requisite number of VVPATs manufactured in 30 months time from the time of
release of fund by the Government.
ECI procured 20,000 VVPATs in 2013 and has since used
VVPATs in 143 Assembly Constituencies. Further, 33500 VVPATs were manufactured
by BEL in 2016 for further use of VVPATs. So far, VVPATs have been used in 255
Assembly Constituencies and 09 Parliamentary Constituencies. In Goa elections
in 2017, VVPAT was employed in all 40 LACs. ECI employed about 52,000 VVPATs in
five States where elections were held recently. Since 2014, ECI has been
relentlessly pursuing with the Govt. for sanction and release of funds of Rs.
3174 cr requisite number of VVPATs so that they could be used in all PCs in GE
to Lok Sabha in 2019.
As explained above, the Commission has put in place an
elaborate technical and administrative system of safeguards to ensure
error-free functioning of EVMs in elections. The Commission is thus fully
satisfied with the tamper proof functioning of the ECI-EVMs. It may be stated
that such allegations and suspicions have not been raised for the first time.
Even on earlier occasions, the Commission has offered opportunities more than
once to those alleging the tamperability of EVM, no one has been able to demonstrate
to the Commission that the EVM with ECI and used in the country’s election
process, can be manipulated or tampered with. The Commission does not find any
merit in such allegations and reject all such allegations and suspicions raised
by some political parties.
ECI assures all citizens that EVM of ECI are temper proof and fully
satisfied with the integrity of electoral process using EVM. ECI will further
enhance confidence of citizens in ECI’s electoral process by deploying VVPAT in
phase manner.
Further, ECI did not receive specific complaints or
concrete material from political parties/candidates about alleged tempering of
EVMs during recently held election process. At this stage, baseless,
speculative and wild allegations are being made which deserves to be rejected.
However, if any specific allegation with material facts is presented
to ECI, the same will be looked into with all seriousness on administrative
sides.
The Election Commission would like to underline that it always had a
firm conviction and complete satisfaction that EVMs could not be tampered with.
Its faith on the machine has never wavered through the conduct of elections in
the last many years including the nationwide general elections in 2004, 2009
and 2014. To date, no one has been able to actually demonstrate that EVMs used
by the Election Commission can be tampered with or manipulated. What has been
demonstrated or claimed to have been demonstrated is on a privately assembled
“look-alike of ECI-EVMs” and not the actual ECI-EVM. However, the extraordinary
measure of requiring demonstration in ECI HQ in 2009 was undertaken by the
Election Commission in fulfilment of its responsibility not to allow even a
small shade of doubt about any aspect of its operation and in order to set at rest
any misgiving anywhere.
Today, the Commission once again completely reaffirms its faith in
the infallibility of the EVMs. These are fully tamper-proof, as ever.
****
Election Commission of India
New Delhi,16 March, 2017
RM//RS